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Table 2.  Factors Reported to Be Associated with Adoption of Floodplain and Other Hazard
Management Measures*
1.  Recognition of Natural Hazards as a Community Problem
The more people recognize that hazards exist and that the probabilities of loss are not trivial, the more likely communities are to
adopt hazard mitigation measures (Alesch and Petak, 1986; Burby and French et al., 1985; Drabek, Mushkatel and Kilijanek, 1983;
French and Harmon, 1982; Godschalk, Brower, and Beatley, 1989; Mushkatel and Weschler, 1985).  The more hazards are viewed
as controllable by individuals, the less likely communities will adopt hazard mitigation measures (Graham, 1982).
Absence of a political constituency for hazard mitigation and presence of active opposition by economic development and real estate
interests diminishes the adoption of such measures (Burby and May et al., 1994; Drabek, 1986; Godschalk, Brower and Beatley,
1989; Rubin, 1981; Wyner, 1984).  Varying values and perceptions among stakeholders makes it difficult, if not impossible, to reach
consensus about appropriate mitigation policy (Alesch and Petak, 1986; Petak, 1984).  Hazards, such as floods, which allow victims
or potential victims to be easily recognized are more amenable to land use adjustments than hazards, such as earthquakes, where
victims are more spatially diffuse (Graham, 1982).
2.  Policy Catalysts
Recent losses due to natural hazards are associated with the adoption of hazard mitigation measures (Alesch and Petak, 1986;
Godschalk, Brower and Beatley, 1989; Luloff and Wilkinson, 1979; May and Williams, 1985; Wyner, 1984; for countervailing
evidence, see Burby and May et al., 1994; Rubin, 1981).  Objective risk of experiencing a hazardous event, as opposed to actually
experiencing such an event, has little effect on community adoption of hazard mitigation measures (Godschalk, Brower and Beatley,
1989) or on local elites' support or opposition to such measures (Mitler, 1989).  One study indicates that uncertain risks are
associated with policy adoption (Graham. 1982), while another suggests that uncertainty leads to fatalism and failure to adopt
adjustments (Wyner, 1984).
Faster growing communities are more likely to adopt hazard mitigation measures than slower growing communities (Burby and
French et al., 1985).
The more intensively hazardous areas are developed, the more likely communities are to adopt hazard mitigation measures (Burby
and French, 1981; Burby and French et al., 1985).
3.  Tractability of the Problem Vis-a-Vis Nonstructural Adjustments
Characteristics of hazards (technical difficulties identifying hazard areas; large size of population whose behavior needs to be
affected; diversity of behaviors to be changed; high costs imposed on a narrow group) reduce the feasibility of nonstructural hazard
mitiation measures (Wyner, 1984).
Alesch and Petak (1986) note that the availability of a policy option that is viewed as practical and efficacious is an important factor
in the adoption of hazard mitigation measures (also see May and Williams 1986).  The more nonhazardous sites available for
development, the more likely communities are to adopt land use adjustments to natural hazards (Burby and French, 1981; Burby,
French et al., 1985; Godschalk, Brower and Beatley, 1989).  Where structural solutions are available (i.e., a distributive or
redistributive solution), communities will look toward them before pursuing land use (i.e., regulatory) adjustments to hazards
(Burby, et al. 1988; Burby and French et al., 1985).  The more visible the costs of the adjustment, the less likely it is to be adopted
(Graham, 1982).  Governments that depend on property taxes for revenue are less likely to adopt land use adjustments than
governments that rely on other revenue sources (Hutton, Mileti et al., 1979).
4.  Commitment of Governmental Leaders and Professional Staff
Higher priority of natural hazards problems is associated with more attention to hazard mitigation (Berke and Beatley, 1992; Burby
and French, 1981; Burby and French et al., 1985; Burby and Dalton, 1994; Burby and May et al., 1994; Dalton and Burby, 1994;
Godschalk, Brower, and Beatley, 1989; May and Birkland, forthcoming; Petak and Atkisson, 1982; Wyner, 1984).  Priority of
natural hazards relative to other problems, however, is irrelevant to support or opposition of nonstructural hazard mitigation among
state and local elites (Mitler, 1989).
The adoption of hazard mitigation measures is associated with the presence of strong advocates who have access to policy makers
and a high degree of legitimacy due to technical expertise, political power, or the prospects of longevity in office (Alesch and Petak,
1986; Beatley and Berke, 1989; Berke, Beatley and Wilhite, 1989; Drabek, Mushkatel and Kilijanek, 1983; May and Williams,
1985; Wyner, 1984).
Table 2. continued
5.  Capacity of Governmental Leaders and Staff
Lack of trained personnel diminishes local attention to hazard mitigation (Berke and Beatley, 1992; Burby and Dalton, 1994;
Godschalk, Brower and Beatley, 1989; French and Harmon, 1982; Mushkatel and Weschler, 1985; Petak, 1984; Wyner 1984); staff
professionalism increases such attention (Hutton, Mileti et al., 1979).  Larger governments are more likely to adopt hazard
mitigation measures (Hutton, Mileti et al., 1979).  Larger jurisdictions are more likely to adopt hazard mitigation measures than
smaller jurisdictions (Burby and French, 1981; Burby and French et al. 1985; Godschalk, Brower and Beatley, 1989; Hutton, Mileti
et al., 1979; for countervailing evidence, see Berke and Hinojosa, 1987; Rubin, 1981).
Local governments with more experience with land use management are more likely to use nonstructural adjustments (Burby and
French, 1981; Burby and French et al., 1985).  Communities whose personnel participate more frequently in professional meetings
(where nonstructural adjustments to hazards are discussed) are more likely to adopt such measures than communities where such
participation is low (Alesch and Petak, 1986).
6.  Capacity of Community to Support Land Use Adjustments
Higher median home values/community wealth are associated with local attention to hazard mitigation (Burby and Dalton, 1994;
Burby and French, 1981; Burby and French et al., 1985; Godschalk, Brower and Beatley, 1989; Hutton and Mileti et al., 1979;
Nilson and Olsen, 1981; Wyner, 1984).
7.  Inclusion of Natural Hazards in Local Comprehensive Plans
When local governments prepare comprehensive plans that include (more) attention to natural hazards through provision of facts
about hazards, goals for hazard reduction, and policy proposals, local governments are more likely to adopt measures to limit the
development of hazardous areas (Burby and Dalton, 1994; Burby and May et al., 1994).
8.  Intergovernmental Mandates
State and federal planning and development management mandates increase local governments' adoption of nonstructural hazard
mitigation measures (Berke and French, 1994; Burby and French et al., 1985; Burby and Dalton, 1994; Burby and May et al., 1994).
